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ABSTRACT 
Information, while always a critical element of warfare, is quickly becoming 
decisive in present day conflicts.  While the use of this information can take many 
forms, one area where the discussion of information’s impact on conflict has 
been delinquent is in the art of deception.   
Hizballah and Israel serve as the perfect backdrop to examine the effects 
of deception in current conflicts.  While Israel has always maintained a hard 
power advantage through its military might and prowess, Hizballah looked for 
other ways to level the playing field.  The use of information in supporting 
deception, which has been a key enabler for the weaker side, became one of the 
answers to redressing the military balance.  
This paper will demonstrate that Hizballah, fighting an asymmetric conflict 
with Israel, used deception very effectively in their defense of southern Lebanon 
during the 2006 Summer War; this use of deception significantly offset many of 
Israel’s hard power advantages. It will also show that Hizballah’s use of 
information technologies greatly enhanced their ability to wield deception.  
Finally, this paper will address the interrelation of various information activities 
and the need to maintain consolidation of these activities for planning and 
execution on the modern battlefield. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
makara (Arabic): n. deception.1 
There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about 
who's got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information. 
What we see and hear, how we work, what we think... it's all about 
the information! 2 
- Ben Kingsley as “Cosmo”  
Sneakers, 1992 
Information, while always a critical element of warfare, is quickly becoming 
decisive in the conflicts of the present day.  The rapid propagation of information 
technology across the world has dramatically altered human interaction and the 
conduct of communications from the local to the global level.  In a recent article 
entitled “Mind Maneuvers” published in Armed Forces Journal, author Frank 
Hoffman describes it this way: 
The informational component of war is increasing in impact. 
Modern 24/7 news cycles and graphic imagery, combined with the 
worldwide networks, produce even faster and higher response 
cycles from audiences around the globe and offer powerful new 
tools. Advanced methods and ever lower costs allow many 
insurgent or terrorist groups to communicate directly to their target 
audiences.3 
Being able to get your story out quicker and having it be more believable 
than your opponent’s increases one side’s chances to influence their targeted 
audiences, whether they are the enemy, his population, or one’s own populace.  
While the use of this information can take many forms such as public affairs, or 
                                            
1 N. S. Doniach, ed. The Oxford English-Arabic Dictionary, (Oxford, England: Clarendon 
Press, 1972), 310. 
2 Phil Robinson and.Lawrence Lasker et al., Sneakers [Motion picture]. (Hollywood, CA: 
Universal. 1992). 
3 Frank G. Hoffman, “Mind Maneuvers,” Armed Forces Journal, April 2007, 
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/04/2550166/, (accessed 24 April 2007). 
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psychological operations, one area where the discussion of information’s impact 
on conflict has been delinquent is in the art of deception.   
Hizballah and Israel serve as the perfect backdrop to examine the effects 
of deception in current asymmetric conflicts.  While Israel has always maintained 
a hard power advantage through its military might and prowess, Hizballah looked 
for other ways to level the playing field.  The use of information in supporting 
deception, which has been a key enabler for the weaker side, became one of the 
answers to redressing the military balance. Marvin Kalb of the Shorenstein 
Center at Harvard University iterates this very point in a recent paper on the 2006 
Summer War that “In the war of information, news and propaganda, the 
battlefield central to Hezbollah’s strategy, Israel lost this war.”4  Much of this was 
because Hezbollah’s execution of deception. 
Over the 33 days of the conflict, while Israel had the moral high ground for 
action and dominated Hizballah militarily, it was Hizballah’s message that 
permeated many Lebanese and Arab audiences in the region, to give Hizballah 
the appearance of victory nonetheless.  From tactical events like fake bunkers 
along the Blue Line to operational events such as Hizballah’s media tours of 
Beirut and Qana or the alleged hacking of Israeli secure radios, Hizballah’s 
deceptive acts helped to control the strategic narrative Israel and the rest of the 
world saw.  Hizballah’s use of deception in the recent asymmetric conflict with 
Israel shows how effective deception can be in the information age.   
This paper will demonstrate that Hizballah, fighting an asymmetric conflict 
with Israel, used deception effectively in their defense of southern Lebanon 
during the 2006 Summer War; this use of deception significantly offset many of  
                                            
4 Marvin Kalb, “The Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006: The Media As A Weapon in Asymmetrical 
Conflict” Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, February 2007, 
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/presspol/research_publications/papers/research_papers/R29.pdf 
(accessed 24 April 2007). 
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Israel’s hard power advantages. It will also show that Hizballah’s use of 
information technologies greatly enhanced their ability to wield deception.  
Finally, this paper will address the interrelation of various information activities 
and the need to maintain consolidation of these activities for planning and 
execution on the modern battlefield. 
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II. DECEPTION DEFINED 
Warfare is the art of deceit.  Therefore, when able, seem to be 
unable; when ready, seem unready; when nearby, seem far away; 
and when far away seem near.  If the enemy seeks some 
advantage, entice him with it.  If he is in disorder, attack him and 
take him.  If he is formidable, prepare against him.  If he is strong, 
evade him.  If he is incensed, provoke him.  If he is humble, 
encourage his arrogance.  If he is rested, wear him down.  If he is 
internally harmonious, sow divisiveness in his ranks.  Attack where 
he is not prepared; go by way of places where it would never occur 
to him you would go.5 
- Sun Tzu 
The Art of War 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to fully understand deception and how to employ it effectively, it is 
first necessary to define the concept and understand its characteristics.  The 
purpose of this chapter will be to examine the definition of deception and explore 
exactly what constitutes a deception operation.  This will be accomplished by 
reviewing existing literature on the characteristics and types of deception used in 
conflicts.  To further examine deception, this chapter will look at exactly how a 
deception operation works in terms of the perceptions, sensors and centers of 
gravity that must be targeted to accomplish the task.  Finally, this chapter will 
look at complimentary information activities which support deception: denial or 
operational security, electronic warfare (EW), psychological operations (PSYOP), 
computer network operations (CNO).  By looking at all these concepts and 
seeing how deception works it will be possible to establish criteria from which to 
evaluate how Hizballah used deception in their operations in the summer of 2006 
and the degree of effectiveness.   
 
                                            
5 Caleb Carr, ed., The Book of War, (New York: Modern Library Books, 2000), 65.  
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B. DECEPTION EXPLORED 
Simply put deception is the deliberate misrepresentation of reality done to 
gain a competitive advantage.6  It has been used throughout history for one side 
or another to gain an advantage over their opponent.  In many cases its use by 
the weaker side compensates for numerical deficiencies such as soldiers, 
equipment and even economic resources; for that reason the weaker side often 
has a more powerful incentive to resort to the use deception in their operations.7 
As effective a tool as it might be, there are still many biases to its use in modern 
armies such as the United States. 
Unlike many other concepts in warfare, deception is not a science, but 
much more like an art form.  As Michael Handel describes “deception is a 
creative art and not an exact science or even a craft.”8  He goes on to add that 
“this explains why, despite the large number of war memoirs and detailed military 
histories which discuss deception, little has been written on the theory of 
deception or how to practice it.”9  For this reason it is often ignored today.  
Despite fears associated with deception, it should be obvious that “deception 
planning can be quite involved and complex; its execution can be quite risky, but 
its benefits can be overwhelming.”10   
For many the idea of deception in warfare conjures up images of cloak 
and dagger activities, such as inflatable tanks and aircraft used in Operations 
FORTITUDE, the deception plan for the Allied invasion of Normandy or the 
infamous dead body of Operation MINCEMEAT, the deception for the Allied 
                                            
6 Donald C. Daniel and Katherine Herbig, “Propositions of Military Deception,” in Strategic 
Military Deception, ed. Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig, (New York: Pergamon Press, 
1982), 3. 
7 Michael Handel, “Intelligence and Deception,” in Military Deception and Strategic Surprise, 
ed. John Gooch and Amos Perlmutter, (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, 1982), 123-4. 
8 Handel, 136. 
9 Ibid., 136. 
10 Charles Fowler and Robert Nesbit, “Tactical Deception in Air-Land Warfare,” Journal of 
Electronic Defense, June 95, 42. 
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invasion of Sicily.  For most Americans just the idea of deception, in the words of 
Walter Jajko, a career intelligence officer, is seen as “intimidating, unacceptable, 
and even evil…sinister and, therefore, suspect.”11  James Dunnigan and Albert 
Nofi in their piece “Deception Explained, Described, and Revealed,” make a 
similar point to Jajko’s in that “deception is at once one of the most powerful 
weapons a soldier has access to, and the one most frequently avoided because 
of the risk.”12  Yet this should not be the case.  Dunnigan and Nofi go on to add 
that deception “is too useful a tool to abandon simply because the troops might 
not be up to it.”13  Deception has always been an aspect of war, even being 
mentioned in the Old Testament of the Bible and the Koran as a mean of 
overcoming adversaries.14 
While modern armies may have prejudices against the use of deception, 
the advent of the information age and information warfare does not change the 
prospects for its use in modern conflicts; in fact the opposite is quite true.  As 
retired U.S. Army Colonel Steve Fondacaro professes  
The new element of power that has emerged in the last thirty to 
forty years and has subsumed the rest is information.  A revolution 
happened without us knowing or paying attention.  Perception truly 
now is reality, and our enemies know it.  We have to fight on the 
information battlefield.15 
Jajko continues this thought with regards to deception that “The advent of 
information warfare offers unprecedented opportunities for deception operations  
                                            
11 Walter Jajko, “Deception: Appeal for Acceptance; Discourse on Doctrine; Preface to 
Planning,” Comparative Strategy, 21: 351-363, 2002. 
12 James Dunnigan and Albert Nofi, “Deception Explained, Described, and Revealed,” 
Victory and Deceit: Dirty Tricks in War (New York: W. Morrow, 1995), 2. 
13  Ibid., 5. 
14 See Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The Meaning of the Holy Qur’an, (Baltimore MD: Amana 
Publications, 1989), 141 and the story of Gideon in Judges 7, New International Version Bible. 
15 George Packer, “Knowing the Enemy,” New Yorker, 18 December 2006. 
http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil (accessed 7 June 2007). 
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in scope, effect, and imagination.”16 Thus the study of deception and the ways to 
employ it into conflicts of the information age must continue to be studied and 
evaluated.   
C. GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
Deception, while easy to define, has many unique characteristics and can 
be quite difficult to grasp.  As discussed earlier just the thought of injecting 
deception into an operation can cause a stir because of its connotations.  As 
previously mentioned, deception is “the deliberate misrepresentation of reality 
done to gain a competitive advantage,” in the words of Donald Daniel and 
Katherine Herbig.17  In order to gain this advantage, Herbig and Daniel list three 
goals that a deception operation must have: to condition the target’s beliefs; to 
influence the target’s actions; and ultimately for the deceiver to benefit from the 
target’s actions.18  There are many ways to accomplish these goals.  James 
Dunnigan and Albert Nofi in their piece entitled “Deception Explained, Described, 
and Revealed” list nine techniques which may be employed in deception.  These 
include: concealment, camouflage, false and planted information, ruses, displays, 
demonstrations, feints, lies, and insight.19  While no deception operation need 
use of all these techniques, they serve as an important guideline for the 
employment and evaluation of deception later on. 
In addition to these characteristics of deception another point that Herbig 
and Daniel bring up deals with types of deception.  In their writings, these authors 
describe two types of deception: ambiguity increasing, and misleading types.  
The first, ambiguity increasing or A-type, “confuses a target so that the target is 
unsure as to what to believe.”20  They go on to discuss that “in order to have an 
                                            
16 Jajko, 362. 
17 Daniel and Herbig, 3. 
18 Ibid., 5. 
19 Dunnigan and Nofi, 22.  
20 Daniel and Herbig, 5. 
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impact, A-type deceptions require that the deceiver’s lies be plausible enough 
and consequential enough to the target’s well being that the target cannot ignore 
them.”21  In essence this means that the deception operation aims to confuse the 
target so that they are unsure as to what an exact course of action will be or how 
to react to it.  In history this is often associated with Operation BODYGUARD, in 
which the Allies created the allusion of an amphibious invasion somewhere in 
Europe, ranging from Scandinavia to the south of France.  Because there existed 
a sense of ambiguity as to where an invasion would occur, the Germans were 
forced to keep combat forces arrayed across the theater, preventing them from 
reinforcing the French coast, where the real invasion occurred. 
The second type of deception, the misleading or M-type, seeks to “reduce 
ambiguity by building up the attractiveness of one wrong alternative.”22  This type 
of deception operation has the target putting all of his eggs in one basket (i.e. the 
wrong alternative), thus allowing the deceiver a much great chance for success 
in greater operation.  As the Allies in World War II learned through intelligence 
sources that the Germans believed that the actual invasion of Europe would 
come at the Pas de Calais shortly before the real Normandy invasion, Allied 
deception planners created Operation FORTITUDE SOUTH, a M-type deception 
designed to reinforce this wrong alternative’s attractiveness.  Abandoning the A-
type deception of invasion somewhere across Fortress Europe sought in 
BODYGUARD, FORTITUDE SOUTH particularly “sought to portray the 
Normandy landings as preliminary to a much larger invasion at Pas de Calais.23  
This deception operation as Dunnigan and Nofi point out kept German Army 
units positioned near the Pas de Calais for a remarkable six weeks after D-Day 
“preparing to repel an invasion that was never intended.24   
                                            
21 Daniel and Herbig, 5. 
22 Ibid., 10. 
23 Ibid., 6. 
24 Ibid., 7. 
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D. THE MECHANICS OF DECEPTION 
Having looked at factors involved in employment of deception, the next 
task to examine is how and why deception works.  Richards Heuer, an author on 
the psychological aspects of deception provides much insight on the cognitive 
aspects of why deception works.  Key to his work, Heuer looks at perceptions.  
Heuer makes the comment that “we tend to perceive what we expect to perceive” 
and that “it takes more information, and more unambiguous information, to 
recognize an unexpected phenomenon than an expected one.”25  He goes on to 
say that one of the most important characteristics of perceptions is that “they are 
quick to form but resistant to change.”26  An opponent will base much of how he 
plans and fights on how he perceives the other side’s actions.  Being able to 
manipulate this thinking process of what is seen and how it is perceived is key to 
launching a deception operation.  Giving an enemy a picture of what he expects 
is or what he has been led to expect is the goal of deception.  Heuer summarizes 
this when he writes “it is far easier to lead a target astray by reinforcing the 
target’s existing beliefs, thus causing the target to ignore the contrary evidence of 
one’s true intent, than it is to persuade a target to change his or her mind.”27   
In order to affect the enemy’s perception, a successful deception strategy 
needs to capitalize on a hierarchy of information flow.  This hierarchy consists of 
three levels: the enemy commander, his intelligence agencies, and finally the 
sensors which collect information.  A model for this structure can be found in 
Figure 1.  
                                            
25 Richards J. Heuer, “Cognitive Factors in Deception and Counterdeception,” in Strategic 
Military Deception, ed. Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig, (New York: Pergamon Press, 
1982), 34. 
26 Ibid., 36. 
27 Ibid., 42. 
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Figure 1.   Deception Information Flow to Target 
 
Central to making any deception strategy succeed is a plan which targets 
the enemy leadership.  In the words of Thaddeus Holt in the book The Deceivers, 
“Deception is aimed at the enemy commander, by way of his intelligence 
people.”28  He goes on to add that “To gauge the enemy commander’s reaction 
you must know him; know how his mind works, know what makes him tick, know 
what kind of stimulus will evoke what kind of response.29  Jajko also emphasizes 
this as he writes “The target of any deception is the adversarial decisionmaker,” 
and that “deception activities are intended to affect an adversarial leadership’s 
behavior—always behavior…”30  With that in mind, the next step of the deception 
information flow lies with the adversarial intelligence agencies.  Holt argues “The 
enemy commander is the deceiver’s target, but he is not the deceiver’s customer.  
The customer is the enemy intelligence service, who gather and process 
information and present it to the commander.”31  These intelligence services or 
agency operatives in the words of Herbig and Daniel, “seek out and collect 
                                            
28 Thaddeus Holt, The Deceivers, (New York: Scribner, 2004), 56. 
29 Ibid., 56. 
30 Jajko, 354. 
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information and analysts who coordinate and evaluate it.”32  Yet even below the 
intelligence collectors and analysts, at the basic level lies the sensors from which 
they collect.  Sensors are any form of information gathering asset to include, but 
not limited to: spies, radio, television, signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery, and 
in today’s information age, the internet, cell phones, etc.  How one side is able to 
engage and influence an opponent’s sensors will greatly influence how effective 
a deception plan will be.  Both being able to paint a believable picture for an 
adversary’s sensors of the pieces of one’s deception puzzle and then being able 
to send enough signals to those sensors so that they are picked up, analyzed 
and the intended actions realized by one’s foe are key to making deception work.  
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate these points.   
 
Figure 2.   The Deception Puzzle33  
                                            
32 Daniel and Herbig, 8. 








Figure 3.   Possibilities during the transmitting and interpreting of a signal34 
 
Given Figure 2-2 represents the deception picture and its pieces that one 
side wants to project to an adversary, Daniel and Herbig determined that there 
are the five possible outcomes represented by Figure 2-3 for each signal or 
piece.35  The first outcome, A, represents “the deceivers fondest hope” that the 
adversary would receive the message and act accordingly.  Outcome B, on the 
other hand, represents a signal that is garbled or fails to be recognized by the 
enemy’s sensors.  The next two outcomes, C and D, represent signals that while 
might have reached the enemy’s intelligence service, are either misinterpreted 
(outcome C), or disregarded after initial receipt (outcome D).  Finally, the last 
outcome E, portrays a signal that fails altogether to make it to the enemy’s 
sensors for one reason or another.  In summary then a deception operation will  
                                            
34 Daniel and Herbig, 11. 















work best when one is able to fool their opponent by manipulating their 
opponent’s sensors into seeing a picture that is contrary to what one’s true 
intentions are.   
Finally, when considering deception in the information age, Robert Nesbit 
and Charles Fowler in the Journal of Electronic Defense, iterate the relationship 
between advanced sensor technology and deception in that “It is quite 
possible…overall vulnerability to deception could increase as one’s sensors 
become more sophisticated.”36  This hypothesis holds true for the summer 
conflict in 2006.  Having looked at how deception works, the next task is to look 
at those activities which closely relate to it.   
E. RELATED ACTIVITIES 
The final area with which to examine deception involves its relationship to 
other types of information operation capabilities.  According to U.S. doctrine, 
capabilities linked to deception include: operational security (OPSEC), computer 
network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), public affairs 
(PA), and electronic warfare (EW).37  While all of these activities are considered 
information activities, those most applicable to this discussion are OPSEC, and 
PSYOP.   
Perhaps the greatest complementary activity to deception is that of 
OPSEC or, as it is more commonly known, denial.  This term refers to “the 
attempt to block all information channels by which an adversary could learn some 
truth (e.g. about a military development program, a policy, course of action, etc.), 
                                            
36 Fowler and Nesbit, 77. 
37 As described in Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Information Operations, the linkages are very 
clear and thus can be applied to any military force to include terrorist and insurgent networks For 
further information on the inter-relationships between information operations capabilities, 
supporting and related capabilities see: U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-13: 
Information Operations, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 13 February 2006), 
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thus preventing him from reacting in a timely manner.”38  Essentially, this is the 
same thing as OPSEC.39  The JP 3-13 describes the relationship between 
OPSEC and deception as that “while MILDEC seeks to encourage incorrect 
analysis, causing the adversary to arrive at specific false deductions, OPSEC 
seeks to deny real information to an adversary and prevent correct deduction of 
friendly plans.”40  Abram Shulsky, in the book Strategic Denial and Deception, 
notes: 
Almost by definition, deception must include denial: in order to 
induce an adversary to accept a cover story, information that would 
reveal the true state of affairs must be denied him.  Conversely, 
a…denial effort may well include some element of deception.  In 
order to deny the adversary knowledge of the truth, it may be 
advisable to develop and provide him with a “cover story” to help 
explain any information about the actual state of affairs that might 
get through to him.41 
The use of PSYOP or psychological warfare is another information activity 
where parallels can be drawn to deception.  The US defines PSYOP as “planned 
operations to convey selected truthful information and indicators to foreign 
audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and 
ultimately, the behavior of their governments, organizations, groups and 
individuals.”  Furthermore, the US regards PSYOP’s purpose as “to induce or 
reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives.”  
Another author, Ron Schliefer, in his article detailing Hezbollah’s psychological 
operations prior to Israel’s withdrawal in 2000, claims that PSYOP “consists of 
                                            
38 Abram Shulsky, “Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception,” ed. Roy Godson and 
James J. Wirtz, in Strategic Denial and Deception, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 
2006), 15. 
39 JP 3-13, Information Operations defines OPSEC as the process of identifying critical 
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friendly information is necessary for the adversary to have sufficiently accurate knowledge of 
friendly forces and intentions; deny adversary decision makers critical information about friendly 
forces and intentions; and cause adversary decision makers to misjudge the relevance of known 
critical friendly information because other information about friendly forces and intentions remains 
secure. JP 3-13, II-4. 
40 Ibid., II-2. 
41 Shulsky, 16. 
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delivering messages by nonviolent methods, to target audiences, domestic and 
neutral as well as among the enemy, with the aim of furthering the war effort.”42  
While Thaddeus Holt echoes that in deception “Your goal is not to make the 
enemy think something; it is to make him do something,” there is substantial 
overlap between these two areas.43  Both PSYOP and deception must affect 
one’s cognitive thought processes in order to achieve effects and both seek to 
have an adversary take action in one way or another.  Perhaps the best way to 
think these two information activities is that basically PSYOP deals in the truth 
and deception in lies.  
F. METHODOLOGY 
Having explored the definition, characteristics, objectives and types of 
deception, it is now possible to establish criteria from which to evaluate deception 
operations and their effectiveness.  Based on the information provided by Herbig 
and Daniel, a successful deception operation must meet the following criteria: 1) 
condition the target’s beliefs; 2) influence the target’s actions; and 3) the target’s 
actions must benefit the deceiver. 
In addition to these criteria a deception operation should fall into one of 
the categories of either ambiguity increasing or misleading types.  It must also 
show those sensors which picked up the deceptive information as well.  Finally, a 
deception must fall into one of the nine techniques listed by Dunnigan and Nofi 
as closely as possible.  In order to better visualize these criteria the following 
table will be used to evaluate the four cases of deception from the summer of 
2006 conflict:  
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- condition the target’s beliefs 
- influence the target’s actions 
- target’s actions must benefit the deceiver 
 
Sensors targeted?  
Type:  
M-type or A-type? 
 
9 Characteristics? 
(concealment, camouflage, false and 
planted information, ruses, displays, 
demonstrations, feints, lies, and insight)  
 
Table 1.   Deception Criteria Evaluation Table 
 
With these criteria established it will be possible to study Hizballah’s 
deception operations from the 2006 Summer War and determine their 
effectiveness. 
G. CONCLUSION 
The art of deception is just that: a rare gem in the rough of many other 
forms of military science.  While often misunderstood and under utilized, if used 
properly, the returns on the small amount invested can be enormous.  As Michael 
Handel summarizes “Deception is cheap.  It is neither labor- nor capital-intensive.  
It is among the least expensive types of modern intelligence work yet yields a 
high return for a relatively small investment.”44   In order to effectively launch a 
deception operation signals must follow the hierarchy from sensor to intelligence 
service to the real target, the enemy leader.  In addition to following this model, 
key to this are those related activities like denial and OPSEC which bring as 
much weight to an operation as the deception itself.  Finally, based on this 
information it is possible to construct guidelines for what constitutes a deception 
and how effective this deception really is.  Having thoroughly looked at 
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deception, the focus now will be to examine Hizballah and how their development 
and capabilities have propelled them to be one of the world’s most skilled users 
of deception today. 
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III. HISTORY AND ORGANIZATION OF HIZBALLAH 
Free downtrodden men, 
We are the sons of Hizb Allah’s nation in Lebanon.  We greet you 
and address the entire world through you: notables, institutions, 
parties, organizations and political, humanitarian, and information 
associations.  We exclude nobody because we are eager for all to 
hear our voice, understand our word, comprehend our projections, 
and study our plan.45 
A. INTRODUCTION 
With these words a little known terrorist group announced to the world its 
intentions and dynamics.  Born out of the chaos of the Lebanese civil war, 
Hizballah, the Party of God, quickly made a name for itself not only as a terrorist 
group, but in time as a complex organization reaching out across sectarian lines 
throughout the country. But what exactly is Hizballah?  The answer to that 
question is the key to understanding the dynamics of this diverse organization.  
To the United States and Israel, it is viewed as a terrorist organization, an 
asymmetrical army of the regimes in Iran and Syria.  To the Shi’a of Lebanon, it 
is seen as a social welfare organization.  To many Lebanese it is seen as a 
political party and the primary resistance group to Israeli aggression.  In essence 
it is all these things and more—Hizballah over the course of the last twenty five 
years has evolved from a rag-tag militia in Lebanon’s Biqaa Valley to a diverse 
organization with global reach.   
This chapter will examine Hizballah’s history and organization and how 
these factors contributed to the group’s effective use of deception in their conflict 
with Israel.  It will look at how the recent history of Lebanon to include the Civil 
War and its aftermath helped shape Hizballah.  It will also look at how Hizballah 
has transformed in recent years to meet new challenges in Lebanon.  Finally, this 
paper will investigate the current organization of the group and why this structure 
                                            
45 Taken from Open Letter Addressed  by Hizb Allah to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and in 
the World, translated in: Augustus Richard Norton,  Amal and the Shi’a: Struggle for the Soul of 
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has enabled it to be a worthy adversary on today’s information battlefield.   Only 
by examining the history and organization of this robust institution can one take a 
full appreciation of its capabilities.   
B. LEBANON: MODERN HISTORY 
Lebanon was built on a delicate balance of power originating from its 
unique form of government known as the confessional system.  Upsetting that 
balance on any leg would have terrible consequences for the country.  The 
premise of the confessional system developed between the 1920s and 1940s is 
there exists a relative balance of power between the three major sects inside 
Lebanon: the President would be Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni 
Muslim and the Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament a Shi’a Muslim.  This 
system came about initially from the establishment of the Lebanese constitution 
in 1926, but as Helena Cobban notes “the 1926 constitution also stated that it 
should be applied only ‘temporarily’, until a fully non-sectarian system could 
develop in the country.”46  As the years went on, the internal politics of Lebanon 
and the burden of the Arab-Israeli conflict combined to place a heavy strain on 
the delicate confessional system, finally culminating in civil war in 1975. 
Lebanon’s system cracked from the pressures put upon from the Arab-
Israeli conflict.  Many in the Arab world, shocked by the rapid defeat of their 
forces, soon realized that “Guerrilla action...could ‘redeem the honour of the 
Arabs’, which the regular armies had so disgracefully lost”.47  In the years that 
followed the 1967 War and later the Black September events in Jordan in 1970, 
many Palestinian refugees settled in Lebanon.  As refugee camps stood up and 
calls went out to join new Palestinian militias to fight the Israelis, many Lebanese 
found themselves having to choose not between sectarian divides, but rather 
whether or not they were “Arab.”48  In time these Palestinian militias started 
                                            
46 Cobban, 62. 
47 Cobban, 102. 
48 Cobban, 103.   
  21
cross-border raids against the Israelis, and the Israelis in turn attacked back into 
Lebanon.  The strain of the Palestinians took its toll on the Lebanese 
government, as many in Maronite and Shi’a sects found themselves deeply at 
odds with their Sunni brethren over the issue of supporting the Palestinians.  
Thus by 1975 these divisions brought Lebanon into civil war.  This civil war 
brought with it foreign intervention by way of Syria, Israel and later on Iran.  
C. THE CREATION AND RISE OF HIZBALLAH  
The story of Hizballah begins in 1982 following the Israeli invasion in June 
to oust Palestinian militants in southern Lebanon when Iran, in an effort to export 
its brand of Islamism following its revolution of 1979, decided to support the 
creation of its own militia in Lebanon with the intent of creating an Islamic state.  
Several factors such as Lebanon’s civil war starting in 1975, the empowerment of 
the Shi’a in Lebanon throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, and the Israeli 
invasion all contributed to this decision to form a new militia.  The decision of 
Amal, an already existing Shi’a militia in Lebanon, to join the National Salvation 
Authority, which would help to oversee Lebanon during this crisis period, did not 
bode well with Tehran either.  The Iranians saw this body not as a means of 
unifying Lebanon but rather it “symbolized the Western takeover of Lebanon and 
the perpetuation of the ‘Zionist occupation’ of the country”.49  Iran saw the 
decision by Nabih Berri, Amal’s leader, to join the National Salvation Authority as 
a sin by both Amal and Berri “without expiation”.50 As a result, in late 1982 Iran 
sent several hundred members of its Revolutionary Guard also known as 
Pasdaran to help stand up and train this new Shiite organization.51  In addition, 
Abbas Musawi, second in command of Amal’s militia forces, split from Amal 
taking with him a number of fighters and headed out to Baalbek in the Beqaa 
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Valley, seizing Amal’s assets in the area and calling his new group Amal Islami.52  
Rapidly other groups began to link up with this emerging force in Baalbek, as the 
city began taking on a very Islamic feel to it.  Shimon Shapira illustrates in his 
piece “Origins of Hizballah” that in Baalbek “the sale of liquor was prohibited, 
women were compelled to dress modestly, and the city began to resemble Iran in 
every way” with huge posters of Ayatollah Khomeini and other Iranian leaders 
helping to intensify this new “Iranian” atmosphere.53  This radical Islamic group, 
trained & financed by the Iranians, had clear objectives in these early years: a 
holy war to drive out foreign forces, followed by the ouster of the Christian 
government and the installation of an Islamic regime.54   
1. The Early Years 
Throughout the 1980s Hezbollah was synonymous for some of the most 
egregious acts of terrorism in the Middle East.  The year 1983 would mark the 
beginning of Hizballah’s violent campaign to rid Lebanon of both Israel Defense 
Forces and the international peacekeeping troops.  On 23 October 1983, 
Hizballah blew up the United States Marine Corps Barracks in Beirut killing 240 
U.S. service personnel, as well as nearly simultaneously blowing up a French 
Paratroop barracks nearby killing 58.  IDF headquarters and other key Israeli 
positions quickly became targets for Hizballah as well.  The calling card for 
Hizballah’s attacks was the suicide bomber, usually driving a truck full of 
explosives into a thinly protected target. The psychological effect of these suicide 
attacks was very evident.  By 1984 the most of the Multinational peacekeeping 
force had withdrawn from Beirut and by 1985 the IDF withdrew to a security zone 
south of the Litani river. This fact prompted one Hizballah leader to acknowledge 
years later that “it was not the military use of suicide-bombers that led to the 
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Israeli withdrawal in 1985, but its deterrent effect on Israeli public opinion”.55  The 
group was linked to the kidnapping of several westerners to include Terry 
Anderson and CIA Station Chief William Buckley.56  In addition western 
governments attributed several hijackings to Hizballah including Trans World 
Airlines 847 in 1985 which left one U.S. sailor dead.  Initially seen as a 
competitor to the more widely popular Amal movement, Hizballah was able to 
push Amal out of power by the late 1980s.  By 1985 Hizballah conducted 90% of 
the attacks against the IDF in southern Lebanon and many saw the group 
becoming “the sole party to conduct the struggle against Israel”.57  Hizballah’s 
image as the sole resistance to Israeli aggression continued until Israel finally 
withdrew from its security zone in southern Lebanon in 2000.  
2. The “Lebanonization Process” 
“The upcoming battle, the battle for normalization,” Sheikh Hassan 
Nasrallah once remarked, “is much tougher than the military battle and will 
require greater efforts and capabilities”.58  Initially Hizballah, with Iran’s blessing, 
sought to integrate Lebanon into a greater Islamic state, but the end of the civil 
war brought about a major shift in the group’s political outlook.59  At this point 
and with the coming of the first Parliamentary elections in nearly 20 years in 
Lebanon in 1992, Hizballah turned to politics.  The process of Hizballah’s 
transformation from a purely combat force into the political spectrum has been 
dubbed by many as the “Lebanonization process”.60  Reasons for this shift A. 
Nizar Hamzeh points to in his piece entitled “Lebanon’s Hizbullah: from Islamic 
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revolution to parliamentary accommodation,” included the change in Iran’s 
leadership during the early 1990s which brought on a more moderate approach 
to the west as well as thoughts on a great Islamic state.61  Another reason for 
this shift lay with the Taif Accord, largely regarded as the document ending the 
Lebanese civil war. As Magnus Ranstorp describes “The Taif Accord…effectively 
undermined the vacuum in which Hizballah operated, especially as the 
movement faced disarmament along with other militias by April 1991.”62  
Hizballah recognized that in order to have influence in post-war Lebanon it would 
have to work within the political system formed in the aftermath of the civil war, 
and thus “jettisoned its commitment to establishing a system of Islamic rule in the 
country”.63   
While Hizballah always maintained some level of credibility amongst 
Lebanese for its armed resistance to Israel, getting involved into the political 
process brought with it a new sense of legitimacy unable to be attained through 
military force.  During the war Hizballah was seen as having the “moral high 
ground” in the way in which it provided services to many of the Shiites inside 
Lebanon.  Because its funding came from Iran, Hizballah was able to offer many 
of its social welfare programs which supplemented existing governmental 
agencies as opposed to many of the groups to include Amal which were seen as 
exploiting these same government programs.64  Even in the last decade while 
the government continued to rebuild the entire country, Hizballah continued to 
expand it social and public assistance work and “reap the rewards that spin off 
from these endeavours”.65  Yet Hizballah extended these services across 
sectarian lines.  While most services are located in Shi’a areas, Norton points to 
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hospitals and clinics that “also treat all walk-in patients, regardless of political 
views or their sect, for only a small fee.”66  The elections of 1992 and 1996 
showed the major inroads Hizballah had made in its Lebanonization process 
winning several seats in Parliament.  Hizballah had transformed, yet as would be 
shown throughout the 1990s, the organization still maintained its teeth and 
tenacity against Israel. 
3. Hizballah Today 
The Lebanonization process did little to deter the aggressive nature of 
Hizballah to continue the fight against Israel and its occupied zone in southern 
Lebanon.  As the years went by Hizballah continued its attacks against Israeli 
targets.  As Norton demonstrates “the ration of Hizballah to IDF/SLA (Southern 
Lebanese Army) casualties has been less than 2:1, whereas in the past it was 
more than 5:1”.67  After two unsuccessful attempts to try and quiet Hizballah 
along the security zone, Israel finally announced in 1999 its unilateral withdrawal 
from Lebanon to be completed by 2000.  Israeli Operations such as 
Accountability in 1993 and Grapes of Wraith in 1996, did little but to alienate the 
Lebanese much the same as operations in 1978 did.  The one difference 
between these two time periods being that Hizballah maintained a credibility and 
legitimacy that the PLO never had in southern Lebanon amongst the Lebanese.  
Effects of this are shown in a series of surveys conducted by Judith Harik 
published in 1996.  In one particular survey Shi’a when asked which political 
party contributed most to Shiites educational, health, and social needs, picked 
Hizballah with 64% of votes, compared with 20% for Amal and other minor 
groups receiving the other 16%.68  As Israel slowly pulled out of southern 
Lebanon, Hizballah moved in.  While a fear existed amongst many in Lebanon of 
reprisals against Shi’as living inside Israel’s occupied zone, Hizballah, now firmly 
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part of the political process took a different view.  Harik points out that in the 
vacuum of Israel’s pullout in Southern Lebanon, Hizballah only stood to gain by 
welcoming back the population and putting these Lebanese under Hizballah’s 
wing as “the last thing Hizballah would want to do is alienate them and lose their 
votes!”69 
Even in the aftermath of the Israeli withdrawal, Hizballah, who many felt 
would disarm since their goal of pushing out Israel had been achieved, continued 
its resistance.  Targeting the disputed Sheb’a Farms region became Hizballah’s 
new rallying cry.70  The conflict in the summer of 2006 began with the kidnapping 
of the two Israeli Soldiers in Sheb’a Farms area.  One of the key pillars of 
Hizballah has always been its resistance to Israel with regards to southern 
Lebanon.  The 2006 Summer War reiterated this claim.  Furthermore, Hizballah 
still identifies itself with the Sunni group Hamas in the Palestinian territories of 
Gaza and the West Bank.  As Hizballah has changed itself to meet the new 
challenges of Lebanon, the organization has also expanded to meet these new 
needs, branching out from being just a Shi’a militia to reaching out to all of 
Lebanese society. 
D. HIZBALLAH’S ORGANIZATION 
1. Overview 
Hizballah has continually adapted its organizational structure to keep pace 
with the changing environment that it faces in Lebanon.  By being a highly 
flexible combination of capabilities from militia and resistance group to social-
welfare outlet to propaganda machine, Hizballah shows just how capable it is at 
the dawn of the 21st century.   Mona Harb points out that Hizballah’s success is 
“because they operate as an integrated and holistic network.  This network 
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produces individual and collective meaning to its beneficiaries, which in turn, 
explains how and why Hizballah is legitimized as a dominant order among 
Lebanese Shi’a”.71  A. Nizar Hamzeh’s provides perhaps one of the best models 
for the structure below: 
 
Figure 4.   Hizballah Organizational Structure72 
 
While the entire structure is beyond the scope of this paper, much of it is 
worth noting, along with these leaders and will be explained below.   
2. Chain of Command 
At the top of the structure sits the Supreme Shura Council or Majlis al-
Shura composed of 17 members and has the highest authority in the party and is 
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“charged with legislative, executive, judicial, political, and military affairs and with 
overall administration of the party” as Hamzeh describes in his work.73  Key 
members include both clergy and para-military leaders in the group as well as the 
Secretary General and his deputy. Furthermore as Hamzeh describes “no policy 
is legitimate without clearance from the Supreme Shura Council”.74 Below the 
Majlis al-Shura, is the Executive Shura and the Politburo both established in 
1989. Whereas the Executive Shura holds a place of overseeing district actions 
represented by the 5 district heads, the Politburo has the task of coordinating 
work for the various party committees underneath it.  It is from the Politburo that 
Hizballah’s representatives to Parliament often come from.  Before launching into 
further discussion on the various party committees and their roles in Hizballah it 
is important to briefly look at its leader. 
No man more than Hassan Nasrallah has come to symbolize Hizballah in 
the last fifteen years.  Currently he serves as the Secretary General, a post he 
took over in 1992.  Nasrallah grew up in southern Beirut working for his father, a 
grocer until the civil war started.  Initially part of Amal, Nasrallah chose to join the 
clergy and studied in Najaf, Iraq in the late 1970s.  By the early 1980s Nasrallah 
returned to Lebanon and joined the new Shiite militia, Hizballah, rising quickly 
through the ranks as a top field commander.75  In 1992 following the death of his 
mentor, Musawi, Hassan Nasrallah took over Hizballah and led them through the 
Lebanonization process, further strengthening Hizballah’s legitimacy in society.  
Furthermore, he is not seen as some sort of political elite in Lebanon but rather 
“charismatic and pointed”.76  In 1997 one of his sons was killed by an Israeli raid 
in southern Lebanon and this act helped to further increase his legitimacy 
amongst Lebanese because he was seen as a real person who shared a sense 
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of loss like so many in Lebanon.  As Annia Ciezaldo describes “he has already 
earned the distinction of being the only Arab leader to evict Israel from Arab land 
without having to sign a peace treaty”.77   
3. Support Organizations 
As mentioned previously Hizballah maintains several key components or 
organs in which they carry out various functions of the organization.  Of the 4 
organs, only the combat organ reports directly to the Supreme Shura Council, the 
top ruling body of Hizballah, the other three report through the Politburo. Below is 
a detailed description of each. 
a. Combat Organ 
The first of the four organs is that of the combat organ and is 
composed of two parts: the al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah, better known as the 
Islamic Resistance, and the al-Jihad al-Islami (Islamic Holy War).  Of these two 
the Islamic Resistance has the role of “suicidal attacks against Western and 
Israeli targets,” while Islamic Holy War has the mission of more conventional 
attacks.78  It is important to note that Islamic Resistance is not an independent 
combat army; rather it is only composed of members who are combatants in 
times of need, making it “difficult for the party’s enemies to strike at them for they 
would have to strike at the whole population in order to do so.”79 
b. Enforcement, Recruitment and Propaganda Organ 
The next organ is the Enforcement, Recruitment and Propaganda 
which oversees all three of these areas.  Hizballah has a network of preachers in 
Mosques preaching their message and recruiting converts to the cause.  
Research and Propaganda runs two radio stations for the organization: Sawt al-





Iman (Voice of Faith), and Sawt al-Nidal (Voice of Struggle) as well as party 
magazines and newspapers.  The Research and Propaganda wing also is 
responsible for the operation of Hizballah’s own television station, al-Manar (The 
Beacon), which is now available by satellite throughout the Middle East.  Al-
Manar would become a key outlet for information and propaganda during the 
recent conflict and will be discussed in further detail later on. 
c. Holy Reconstruction Organ 
The other organ is the Jihad al-Bina, the Holy Reconstruction 
Organ.  Like the name implies this is the wing of Hizballah oversees eight 
separate committees providing a range of support to members, new recruits and 
supporters of the organization.  The committees provide a wealth of services 
ranging from health care, to water and power to agricultural issues to having its 
own construction companies capable of rebuilding homes and infrastructure.  
Hamzeh points out this committee “repaired and maintained between 1988 and 
1991 over 1000 homes damaged by Israel and other attacks”.80  Funding as 
mentioned before comes directly through Iran and has increased over the years 
from $1.8 million in 1993 to nearly $450 million following the Summer 2006 
conflict.81  Thus by closer examination Hizballah, while not only armed with 
weapons for conventional military and terrorist attacks, is quite capable of 
conducting PSYOP through its own media sources and social welfare projects  
through its Reconstruction committee.   
d. Security Organ 
The final organ to be discussed is the Security organ which is 
divided into three separate parts.  The first part is that of Party security and as 
                                            
80 Hamzeh. 
81 Matthew Levitt, “Shutting Hizballah’s ‘Construction Jihad’” Policy Watch #1202, The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 20 February 2007.  
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2571 (accessed 20 March 2007). 
  31
Hamzeh describes “is in charge of protecting party leaders and members”.82  The 
next branch is that of the Central Security which operates a network of 
surveillance and intelligence gathering operations inside and outside the country.  
Magnus Ranstorp believes that this branch of the security organ most likely has 
elements monitoring internet sites for intelligence taken from Israeli press 
sources about undercover Israeli units operating inside Lebanon, similar to our 
own open source intelligence initiatives.83  The final branch, the Operational 
Security section, oversees decisions made by the greater Security organ against 
Hizballah’s enemies.  Thus Hizballah with this imbedded Security capability is 
more than able to meet the challenges of gathering intelligence and providing 
security to its members.   
E. CONCLUSION 
As shown on the previous pages, Hizballah has transformed itself over the 
last quarter century into a very robust and fluid organization.  Some have 
ventured to label it “the best guerrilla force in the world.”84  Having reached out 
across sectarian divides inside Lebanon and remodeled themselves as to gain 
credibility and legitimacy, it is clear that Hizballah shows no signs of disappearing 
off of the Middle East’s stage any time soon.  Along each transformative step, the 
information operations capabilities of Hizballah have also developed.   From the 
haunting images reflective of suicide bombings in the early 1980s to their open 
source intelligence gathering techniques to the use of satellite television stations 
such as al-Manar, Hizballah’s transformation has made it quite a formidable foe 
in today’s information age.   
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IV. DECEPTION IN THE 2006 SUMMER CONFLICT 
The surprises that I promised you will begin starting now. Now, out 
at sea off the coast of Beirut an Israeli military vessel that attacked 
our infrastructure, that struck the homes of our people, our civilians; 
you can see it burning. It will sink and with it dozens of Zionist 
Israeli troops. This is the beginning. There will be a lot more said 
before the end.85 
Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah 
14 July 2006 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The 2006 summer conflict between Israel and Hizballah was six years in 
the making.  As it played out certain things became quite clear: Hizballah was 
ready, Israel was not.  Over and over again as the war unfolded not only in 
southern Lebanon but on the televisions and computers of the rest of the world, 
the power of Hizballah’s deception plan played out.  As one reporter describes: 
From the onset of the conflict to its last operations, Hezbollah 
commanders successfully penetrated Israel’ strategic and tactical 
decision-making cycle across a spectrum of intelligence, military 
and political operations, with the result that Hezbollah scored a 
decisive and complete victory in its war with Israel.86 
Key to their success was Hizballah’s use of deception in support of their 
overall strategy.  By all means available, Hizballah used deception in the 
prosecution of the conflict with very successful results.  This chapter will examine 
four instances of deception and measure their effectiveness.   
Prior to launching a discussion on the deception campaign in the summer 
conflict, this paper will examine those events leading up to the conflict as well as 
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describing the other critical piece to deception, Hizballah’s use of denial in the 
conflict.  By demonstrating how effective Hizballah’s use of denial was, it will be 
easier to show how their deception worked.  Furthermore, in the discussion of 
deception in Chapter II, several criteria were by which to evaluate Hizballah’s 
acts.  These criteria include the objectives and categories of deception listed by 
Daniel & Herbig , the techniques listed by Dunnigan and Nofi, and the sensors 
utilized to pass the information or signal.  An example table with these criteria is 
listed below:  
CRITERIA EVALUATION 
Three Objectives? 
- condition the target’s beliefs? 
- influence the target’s actions? 
- target’s actions must benefit the 
deceiver? 
 
Sensors targeted?  
Type: 
M-type or A-type? 
 
9 Characteristics? 
(concealment, camouflage, false and 
planted information, ruses, displays, 
demonstrations, feints, lies, and insight)  
 
Table 2.   Deception Evaluation example 
 
By analyzing these acts of deception against these criteria it will prove how 
successful Hizballah’s efforts truly were.  There are four deception acts which will 







Fake Bunkers Tactical Hizballah built fake bunkers to confuse 
Israeli intelligence about the actual 
location of their bunkers 
Electronic 
Warfare Bluff 
Tactical/Operational Hizballah bluffed about being able to 
listen into Israeli secure frequency 
hopping radio systems. 
The Media Operational Hizballah used the media as their tool to 




Tactical/Operational Hizballah “hid” on internet service 
providers in the US to maintain its 
capability to broadcast via broadband. 
Table 3.   Deception Operations Carried Out by Hizballah 
 
Before further exploring these acts however, a discussion on the events of the 
conflict must occur as well as the denial operations which supported them. 
B. BACKGROUND 
As described in Chapter III, the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah is by 
no means new.  Hezbollah has been fighting Israel in a guerrilla-type war since 
its creation in the early 1980s.  In 1985 Israel pulled out of much of Lebanon into 
a security zone along its northern border following a nearly three year occupation 
of most of Lebanon south of Beirut.  Israel hoped to stabilize its northern border, 
Hezbollah however, remained persistent with attacks against Israeli military 
targets in this area.  Twice Israel launched sustained ground offensives outside 
of their self-proclaimed security zone in attempts to stop Hezbollah’s attacks.  
The first, called Operation Accountability, was launched in 1993 by the IDF with 
the intent of putting pressure on Syrian and Lebanese forces to weaken 
Hezbollah, but to no avail.  The second operation, launched in 1996, called 
Operation Grapes of Wrath, was again aimed at putting pressure on Syrian and 
Lebanese forces to weaken Hezbollah, and it too failed.  By the end of the 1990s 
following nearly two decades of conflict, Israel unilaterally withdrew from its 
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southern security zone in Lebanon after the loss of nearly 1,500 soldiers and low 
public support for the mission.  This withdrawal, as Avi Jorish points out in his 
book Beacon of Hatred, “led many to believe that Hizballah had defeated Israel, 
and the party’s reputation consequently soared throughout the entire Arab 
world.”87  Following the withdrawal, Israel and Hezbollah engaged in a quasi-
peace along the southern Lebanese border known commonly as the “Blue Line,” 
monitored by members of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).   
Between UNIFIL, Israel and Hizballah a phony war developed on the Blue 
Line between Israel and Lebanon.  Nicholas Blanford in Jane’s Intelligence 
Review describes the situation between Hezbollah and the IDF in a report from 
2006: “The IR (Islamic Resistance) had been attacking the IDF along the Blue 
Line for six years in a finely calibrated campaign of periodic hit-and-run raids, 
roadside bombings and artillery bombardments.”88  The goal of these actions 
was, as Blanford describes, to “maintain pressure on the IDF without provoking 
Israel into a massive retaliation that could harm Hizbullah’s domestic 
popularity.”89  Furthermore, Hezbollah, in an effort to gain the release of its own 
Israeli held prisoners, began a new strategy: the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers.  
Hezbollah made five attempts before the July 2006 kidnappings to abduct IDF 
personnel.  Israel, already frustrated by the previous actions of Hezbollah, had 
had enough by early this year and a senior IDF leader stated to the UNIFIL 
commander that if Hezbollah attempted another kidnapping, “we will burn 
Beirut”.90  While this information was passed on to the Lebanese government, no 
one is for certain if it was passed onto Hezbollah’s leadership.91  Thus the 
situation was quite tense by the early summer of 2006. 
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Even in the days leading up to the 12 July incident, Hezbollah’s 
leadership, aware of the importance of the tourist season to Lebanon’s economy, 
reassured Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora that no actions would be 
taken by Hezbollah against Israel.92  Meanwhile, standing orders to Hezbollah’s 
Islamic Resistance units along the Blue Line went unchanged: “exploit Israeli  
military weaknesses” and abduct IDF soldiers given the opportunity.93  Under 
these circumstances both sides stood poised for a clash on the morning of 12 
July 2006. 
At a little after nine in the morning local time, an IDF patrol consisting of 
two “Hummvee”  type-vehicles came under fire from IR forces along the Blue 
line.  Within minutes, the patrol, out of communication range with higher 
headquarters and in a blindspot from IDF covering fire, had two dead, three 
wounded and Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser lay in Hezbollah’s hands.94  In 
the following hours, both Hezbollah and the IDF embarked on a series of 
skirmishes along the border resulting in several IDF soldiers killed and injured.  In 
Beirut senior Hezbollah leaders attempted to calm Lebanese officials’ fears about 
Israeli reprisals, even going as so far to speak to the Prime Minister and Minister 
of the Interior.95  This time, unlike previous attempts, Israel did react swiftly.  
Within hours Israeli warplanes attacked Hezbollah positions along the Blue Line 
and destroyed several bridges on the Litani River, in an attempt to isolate the 
southwest portion of the country.  As a response, Hezbollah began to unleash 
scores of Katuysha rockets into northern Israel.  A new chapter in the battle 
between Israel and Hezbollah had begun. 
As the bullets and rockets began to fly across the border, both sides 
identified strategic objectives for the conflict.  Anthony Cordesmen from the 
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Center for Strategic and International Studies, points out that from the onset of 
hostilities the Israeli Cabinet under the direction of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert 
laid out five key Israeli objectives for the war:96 
• Destroy the “Iranian Western Command” before Iran could go 
nuclear 
• Restore the credibility of Israeli deterrence after the unilateral 
withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 and Gaza in 2005, and countering the 
image that Israel was weak and forced to leave. 
• Force Lebanon to become and act as an accountable state, and 
end the status of Hezbollah as a state within a state. 
• Damage or cripple Hezbollah, with the understanding that it could 
not be destroyed as a military force and would continue to be a major 
political actor in Lebanon. 
• Bring the two capture Israeli soldiers back alive without major 
trades in prisoners held by Israel. 
On the other side, Hezbollah had its own objectives.  Their main objective 
lay in humiliating Israel by sheer survival as Hezbollah’s Secretary-General 
Hassan Nasrallah pointed out in an interview on July 21st.  Nasrallah spoke that 
“The victory we are talking about is when the resistance survives.  When its will is 
not broken, then this is a victory”.97 While not much else is known of their 
objectives, because of the tight security within Hezbollah, perhaps another goal 
can be found in Ron Schliefer’s piece, “Psychological Operations: A New 
Variation of an Age Old Art: Hezbollah versus Israel.”  In this article Schliefer 
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describes the psychological warfare executed by Hezbollah in their campaign to 
push Israel out of southern Lebanon leading up to the 2000 withdrawal.  
Hezbollah, Schliefer exerts, “launched a…guerilla war psychologically waged” 
meaning that the organization attacked IDF soldiers, not to conquer land, but as 
an end in itself.98  By drawing out and killing IDF soldiers, Hezbollah had the 
objective of reducing Israeli morale and public opinion to the point where they 
would withdrawal as they had done in 2000.  Thus much of the Hezbollah’s battle 
plan lay in the use of information operations to wear down Israel.   
The war played out on land, in the air, and at sea across Lebanon and 
northern Israel.  Shortly after the commencement of hostilities, Israel began a 
naval blockade of Lebanese ports, hoping to cut off arms shipments to 
Hezbollah.  From the air, Israeli Air Force launched what seemed like a brutal 
series of attacks first aimed at Hezbollah missile and rockets sites in southern 
Lebanon, but then turning on critical Lebanese infrastructure to include crucial 
road intersections, bridges, and even the Beirut airport, in images reminiscent of 
Lebanon in the mid-1980s.  Despite the Israeli Air Force destroying 54 long 
range rocket and missile launch sites in 39 minutes on the first day of the conflict, 
Hezbollah continued to reign down shorter range Katyusha rockets on Israel’s 
northern towns and villages daily.99  By the end of the first 72 hours, Israel’s air 
campaign showed little results of degrading Hezbollah’s capabilities and the 
chances of Israel achieving a decisive victory became “increasingly, and highly 
unlikely”.100   
By the 17th of July, Israel turned to the ground option to combat Hezbollah 
in the south of Lebanon.  Ground forces yielded little more than the air option as 
IDF forces quickly found that the guerrilla force in front of them was quite 
exceptional.  “We didn’t know what hit us,” spoke one IDF soldier after a battle 
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with Hezbollah militia forces to an interviewer with The Sunday Times, “In 
seconds we had two dead”.101  As units pushed north, many found themselves 
surrounded at times, fighting a true asymmetric threat as guerrillas swarmed 
seemingly from all sides with anti-tank missiles and other weapons.  Because of 
this slow going, the ground war had to be expanded to account for the problems 
now faced as Israel’s “blitzkrieg” style assault grinded to a halt.   
In early August, with Israel unable to score a decisive victory, the UN 
pushed all sides in the conflict towards a cease-fire.  On the 14th of August, both 
Hezbollah and Israel agreed to the ceasefire proposal and the guidelines of UN 
resolution 1701.  In 34-days of fighting Israel sent nearly 30,000 soldiers to fight 
in southern Lebanon, while reports of Hezbollah’s numbers are considerably 
less, perhaps as low as 3000, or just one brigade’s worth of militia.102  Even on 
the last day before the ceasefire, Hezbollah rockets and missiles continued to 
rain down on Israel, despite all actions Israel had taken to that point.  UN 
Resolution 1701 provided that the Lebanese Army, under the observation of 
increased UNIFIL force would ensure Hezbollah leaves southern Lebanon, the 
likes of which remain to be seen.  At the termination of hostilities little had 
changed, and Hezbollah was left still standing, deception having played a key 
role at the tactical and operational levels to shape the outcome of the battle. 
C. HIZBALLAH’S DENIAL OPERATIONS 
Even before the conflict started, Hizballah began its campaign to control 
the information battlespace with Israel.  The ability by Hizballah to maintain 
operational security and deny Israel the critical information it would need to 
adjust its battleplans during the course of the conflict would have significant 
repercussions.  By controlling the information environment Hizballah in effect 
dictated the rules of the game and was able to utilize deception.  As mentioned in 
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Chapter II, key to denial is having access to the enemy’s sensors.  There are two 
strikingly different examples of how Hizballah targeted Israeli sensors and 
exploited these sensors to support their war effort.  The first comes through more 
traditional means, namely the use of spies.  The second, broader example, deals 
with the accessibility of information in a closed society versus an open one.  Both 
of these methods of denial significantly contributed to both the war effort and the 
deception plans employed throughout. 
The use of spies is one of the oldest methods of gathering intelligence 
known in warfare and Hizballah made good use of it.  What was significant about 
Hizballah’s use of spies was that they had made significant inroads in the 
previous ten years in counterintelligence efforts against Israel.  In the summer of 
2006 this work paid off.  In an Asia Times Online article, authors Alistair Crooke 
and Mark Perry write “over a period of two years, Hezbollah’s intelligence officials 
had built a significant signals-counterintelligence capability…Hezbollah had 
identified key Israeli human-intelligence assets in Lebanon.”103  They go on to 
add that in the month before the abduction of the two IDF personnel, the 
Lebanese government with assistance from Hizballah broke up an Israeli spy ring 
inside of Lebanon.  Finally, they also remark that “Hizballah had successfully 
‘turned’ a number of Lebanese civilian assets reporting on the location of major 
Hezbollah military caches in southern Lebanon to Israeli intelligence officers.”104  
As will be shown, these actions had dire consequences for the Israelis and were 
critical to Hizballah’s deception plan.  In effect Hizballah effectively closed down 
Israel’s human intelligence capability, often regarded for its “intelligence 
dominance” in previous conflicts against its Arab neighbors.105 
The other key element to Hizballah’s denial campaign involved the high 
degree of internal security within this organization.  Hizballah, as mentioned 
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previously is often thought of as a “state within a state,” and during this campaign 
it demonstrated the high level of security it had amongst its members.  There 
were two ways in which Hizballah controlled its information footprint.  The first 
involves its soldiers and militia on the ground.  So secretive was Hizballah in the 
preparations for the conflict it has been reported that “no single commander knew 
the location of each bunker” from which they would be fighting.106  In addition 
after being hidden during several attempts on his life, Secretary General Hassan 
Nasrallah remarked on how good Hizballah’s security apparatus was when he 
said “Not even I knew where I was.”107 
Alongside the individual security and denial that Hizballah exhibited, they 
tightly controlled open source information coming out of Lebanon.  This allowed 
Hizballah to tell their story better than Israel, because there was only one story to 
tell and then only told by a few high ranking people in Hizballah’s organization.  
Hizballah’s information campaign opens a debate in some circles on lessons 
from the war.  Marvin Kalb describes it this way: 
If we are to collect lessons from this war, one of them would have 
to be that a closed society can control the image and the message 
that it wishes to convey to the rest of the world far more effectively 
than can an open societ, especially one engaged in an existential 
struggle for survival.  An open society becomes victim of its own 
openeness…A closed society conveys the impression of order and 
discipline; an open society, buffeted by the crosswinds of reality 
and rumor, criticism and revelation, conveys the impression of 
disorder, chaos and uncertainty…108 
Hizballah never admitted how many casualties it took during the fighting either, 
another indicator of the high level of security it maintains.109  Thus having a 
closed society with tight control over the media picture greatly enhanced 
Hizballah’s ability to control information broadcasted to the rest of the world.  
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Hizballah’s closed society greatly contributed to their overall denial capabilities 
because it produced a limited information signature greatly restricting information 
Israel could obtain through open source means.   
Again and again throughout the conflict these two key denial operations of 
Hizballah’s would be very significant to only the overall conflict but more 
importantly to this discussion, Hizballah’s deception operations.  The focus now 
will be to examine these operations in depth and evaluate their effectiveness. 
D. THE BUNKERS 
As mentioned earlier, after the first 72 hours of airstrikes by Israel against 
targets across Lebanon, Israeli leaders decided to begin limited ground 
incursions into southern Lebanon.  Very quickly the IDF discovered they were in 
for a surprise.  Hezbollah began to prepare its plan for future battle on the heels 
of Israel’s earlier withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000.  It was at this time 
that Hezbollah began a series of tasks aimed at preparing for conflict in southern 
Lebanon.   
Hizballah undertook an elaborate construction effort of display 
fortifications along the Blue Line with the intent of deceiving information gathering 
assets such as Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles, UNIFIL observers and 
Lebanese spying for Israel.  Meanwhile, in secret locations out of sight of 
information gathering assets, Hizballah built their real bunkers.  It was a classic 
example of military deception; Hezbollah purposely lured observers into believing 
that the openly visible bunkers should be targeted if conflict occurred.  At the 
same time, Hezbollah’s construction of real bunkers went forward “in areas kept 
hidden from the Lebanese population” as Asia Time reports Alistair and Crooke 
note.  They go on to add that “Nearly 600 separate ammunition and weapons 
bunkers were strategically placed in the region south of the Litani”.110  Senior IDF 
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commanders reported when asked about these bunkers that “It’s a very hilly area 
and its not easy.  You cannot identify their bunkers until you’re right there.”111 
The tunnels and bunkers built in view of Israeli and UNIFIL observers 
along with the targets fed back to Israel through Hezbollah’s counterintelligence 
operations identified key emplacements that did not, in fact, exist.112  As one 
former UNIFIL observer describes “We were meant to see these things…They 
were not making any effort to stop us looking…they really fooled us on that 
one”.113  In comparison to the decoy bunkers another UNIFIL officer reports to 
Janes on the real bunkers: “We never saw them build anything.  They must have 
brought the cement in by the spoonful.”114 The deception of the bunkers was 
reinforced by the tight secrecy that Hezbollah maintained through all the years 
leading up to the battle.  Thus when Israel crossed over into southern Lebanon 
much of the intelligence driving their planning would prove false and Israeli 
ground forces paid the price for this intelligence failure.   
Evaluating this case of tactical deception shows just how successful it 
really was.  Furthermore, based on the Dunnigan & Nofi listing of examples, 
these fake bunkers are prime examples of “displays,” in that they attempt to 
“make the enemy see what isn’t there” and that “you’re simply attempting to 
make it appear other than what it really is.”115  When looking at the type of 
deception used, based on Daniel & Herbig’s model, these fake bunkers fall into 
the realm of misleading types or M-type because these displays took attention off 
of the main effort: Hizballah’s construction and defense of the real bunker 
system.  The overall effectiveness can be measured in the statements above 
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taken from UNIFIL representatives and IDF leaders in that they knew virtually 
nothing about the extent of the real bunkers, and focused almost entirely on the 
fake ones.  This case serves as a textbook example of tactical deception in 
warfare.  Below is a summary of this deception operation: 
CRITERIA EVALUATION 
Three Objectives: 
- condition the target’s beliefs? 
- influence the target’s actions? 
- target’s actions must benefit the 
deceiver? 
 
- Israel felt it knew where Hizballah’s 
bunkers were and attacked them early on. 
- Hizballah was able to operate from the real 
bunkers with little threat from Israeli attacks 
Sensors targeted? Israeli UAVs, UNIFIL observers, Lebanese 
spies. 
Type: 
M-type or A-type?  
M-type: the fake bunkers served to mislead 
the IDFs attacks. 
9 Characteristics? 
(concealment, camouflage, false and 
planted information, ruses, displays, 
demonstrations, feints, lies, and insight)  
Display: making the enemy see what isn’t 
there.  Israel and UNIFIL saw bunkers but 
did not see the real bunkers until combat 
began 
Table 4.   Evaluation of Bunker Deception 
 
E. ELECTRONIC WARFARE BLUFF 
In what was another successful use of deception, Hizballah’s electronic 
warfare (EW) bluff also contributed to their overall battle plan.  From the onset it 
appeared that Hezbollah was using a new weapon unseen before in the conflict 
between it and Israel: EW.  Reports came out that Hezbollah, probably assisted 
with Iranian supplied technology, was able to intercept Israel’s secure frequency-
hopping radio transmissions and monitor information on troop movements, 
casualty reports and supply routes.116 As one Israeli officer claims, “They 
monitored our secure communications in the most professional way.” adding that, 
Hezbollah would “send it [casualties’ names] to their al-Manar TV, which 
                                            
116 For further information on this see: Mohamad Bazzi, “Hezbollah Cracked the Code; 
Technology likely supplied by Iran allowed guerillas to stop Israeli tank assaults,” Newsday.com, 
18 September 2006, http://www.newsday.com/news/nationworld/world/ny-
wocode184896831sep18,0,3091818.story?coll=ny-worldnews-print (accessed 21 November 
2006)., 
  46
broadcast it almost live, long before the official Israeli radio.”117  This action 
clearly represented an effective use of PSYOP as well, designed to erode 
popular support for the war back in Israel.  The alleged sophistication of these 
electronic attacks underscored how “the Shia group had higher military 
capabilities” than many in Israel and the United States had originally thought.118  
While Israel did not publicly comment on what it did to counter this threat, 
Hezbollah’s EW attacks prompted one former Israeli general to remark that the 
group’s listening capabilities had “disastrous” consequences for Israel’s offensive 
in southern Lebanon.119 
The news of Hizballah’s EW attacks and penetration of Israel’s secure 
airwaves have since proven untrue.  During and immediately following the 
conflict both U.S. and Israeli technicians examined the problem of whether or not 
Hizballah could actually listen in to supposedly secure frequency-hopping 
technology.  Then in an article published in Aviation Week & Space Technology 
in November 2006, author David Fulghum paints a more realistic picture of what 
Hizballah did; the title says it all: “Doubt as a Weapon.”  According to Fulghum 
who was the first to expose this deceptive act, “Hezbollah is incapable of 
penetrating and exploiting the Israeli army’s tactical radio systems as it claimed it 
did during the recent fighting in Lebanon,” pointing to senior US electronics 
officials for reference.120  The author goes on in his interview: 
What they’re really doing is a very good psychological 
operations…one of the things you want to do is instill doubt.  
Hezbollah makes the pronouncement that they can read encrypted 
radios.  They wanted the IDF troops to believe they weren’t as 
invulnerable as they thought.  It ran like wildfire through the U.S. 
troops as well.  What you’re witnessing is unsophisticated 
technology exploited by sophisticated information operations.  They 
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scored big time in the psychological warfare department the enemy 
is figuring out ways to use the information age against us.121   
The article points out that what most likely occurred was confusion by other news 
agencies in which reporters “confused cell-phone and frequency hopping radio 
technology” and that listening into cell phones is a “basic signals intelligence 
technique” easily accomplished since “Everybody out there has a cell phone.”122   
In what might be considered part of the EW bluff, UNIFIL supplied another 
bit of evidence regarding Israel’s vulnerabilities.  Marvin Kalb in his piece on the 
media’s role in the 2006 conflict argues that UNIFIL “published information on its 
official website about Israeli troop movements, information that in military circles 
would be regarded as ‘actionable intelligence.’”  He provides examples such as 
key IDF units being reinforced, types of equipment traveling across the border, 
and which directions these units headed on various days during the battle.  While 
it is impossible to know for certain whether Hizballah acted on the information 
provided by UNIFIL Kalb argues, it would be silly not to consider this as a prime 
source of intelligence for Hizballah to exploit.123   Having already seen the 
resilience of Hizballah in preparing the defense of southern Lebanon and 
knowing that they have an OSINT capability in their organization, one cannot put 
it past the organization to use these sources to help put together a very credible 
deception of their EW prowess. 
Hizballah’s EW bluff serves as another effective use of deception in this 
conflict, highlighting their capability to conduct more sophisticated information 
operations as well.  While this seems to be more of a problem for Israel at the 
tactical level, it has operational level implications as well, specifically it forced 
Israel to rethink its communications network in the wake of Hizballah’s alleged 
EW capabilities.  Again this is a case of a misleading type of deception whereby 
Hizballah sought to convince Israel of “the attractiveness of one wrong 
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alternative,” that their communication system security had been compromised.124  
Hizballah approached spreading this information by passing false and planted 
information spread through sources like al-Manar and other media outlets and 
reports.  Of the three objectives mentioned by Daniel and Herbig, while it is clear 
in the statements of Israelis that they were convinced Hizballah could listen into 
their radios, it is unknown how the IDF responded, but it most likely had the 
psychological effect of painting them as no longer invulnerable.  Furthermore, on 
the objective of being able to benefit from the target’s actions, Hizballah 
benefited, albeit in a more subtle way.  As the fight continued and casualties 
mounted, many reservists, called up for the war began to wonder why they were 
being sent out as cannon fodder into Hezbollah-controlled villages instead of air 
strikes going in first.  An 11 August 2006 survey conducted by an Israeli 
newspaper found that 91% of respondents felt the IDF should bomb villages to 
take out Hezbollah versus only 8% who felt that ground forces should be used 
instead.125  The results only served to benefit Hizballah because of their control 
of the story inside Lebanon.  Israeli ground and air campaigns would only further 
allow Hizballah to paint a picture of “disproportionality” of Israeli acts.  With all of 
these results in mind the EW bluff successfully served to benefit Hizballah’s 
overall campaign plan.  The following chart summarized this example of 
deception: 
                                            
123 Kalb, 17. 
124 Daniel and Herbig, 6. 
125 Ilene Prusher, “At War, Israeli Reservists wield new weapon: opinion polls,” Christian 
Science Monitor, 16 August 2006, all edition. http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0816/p10s01-





- condition the target’s beliefs? 
- influence the target’s actions? 
- target’s actions must benefit the 
deceiver? 
 
- Israel thought Hizballah could listen to 
secure radio communication. Hizballah 
forced Israel to re-look their actions.   
- Hizballah appeared to be stronger than it 
really was through this act. 
M-type or A-type? 
 
 
M-type: this bluff the attractiveness of one 
wrong alternative (the capability to listen to 
secure radio comms).. 
Sensors targeted? Media, open source intelligence 
9 Characteristics? 
(concealment, camouflage, false and 
planted information, ruses, displays, 
demonstrations, feints, lies, and insight)  
Lies: Hizballah while able to listen to cell 
phones, could not listen to secure radio 
communications, but said they could. 
Table 5.   Evaluation of EW Bluff 
 
Another key lesson to be learned from this example are the linkages 
between various information activities.  While Hizballah bluffed about exactly how 
great their capabilities were, like many deception operations, there existed a 
certain amount of truth in the lie.  They exercised electronic warfare by being 
able to listen into Israeli cell phones and exploiting other information sources as 
part of the deception.  They also used the information they ascertained to 
broadcast on al-Manar, for PSYOP purposes.  Finally, this deception tactic as 
Fulghum described has PSYOP implications because Hizballah “wanted the IDF 
troops to believe they weren’t as invulnerable as they thought” but also “ran like 
wildfire through the U.S. troops as well.”126  Only months after the conflict when 
engineers explained the impossibility of the act did fears subside both in Israel 
and the United States.  But by that time however, the damage had been done. 
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F. MEDIA & THE BATTLE OF THE STORY 
The use of the media by Hizballah in the 2006 conflict shows how effective 
the media can be in deception operations today.  One of the many things that will 
be most remembered about the 2006 Summer Conflict will be the media’s role in 
the war.  The media became a primary weapon of Hizballah against Israel, and a 
key tool for deception.  Marvin Kalb describes it this way: 
During the summertime war in Lebanon, it [the internet] helped 
produce the first really “live” war in history…not until this war have 
networks actually projected in real time the grim reality of the 
battlefield—pictures of advancing or retreating Israeli troops in 
southern Lebanon, homes and villages being destroyed during 
bombing runs, old people wandering aimlessly through the debris, 
some tailed by children hugging tattered dolls, Israeli airplanes 
attacking Beirut airport, Hezbollah rockets striking northern Israel 
and Haifa, forcing 300,000 to evacuate their homes and move into 
underground shelters—all conveyed “live,” as thought the world had 
a front-row seat on the blood and gore of modern warfare.127   
Kalb goes on to add that because so much information was now available to the 
media and the public, that a shift in information flow occurred. “Once upon a 
time,” he writes, “such information was the stuff of military intelligence acquired 
with considerable efforts and risk; now it has become the stuff of everyday 
journalism.  The Camera and the computer have become weapons of war.”128  
Hizballah realized the power of the manipulated media years before the conflict 
and exploited this to the fullest during this war.  Hizballah’s use of the media 
shows where deception can be found in information warfare.  Essentially 
Hizballah’s deception operations utilized the media to conceal the locations of its 
rocket sites often located in urban areas such as Qana and deflect attention from 
their own actions back to painting a picture of Israel’s disproportionate response 
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to the kidnapping the two IDF personnel.  There are two examples of how the 
media became a conduit of Hizballah’s deception plans: through al-Manar, the 
internal media of Hizballah, and through external media, such as CNN and other 
world networks.   
Al-Manar had long been Hizballah’s primary tool of propaganda; one 
journalist goes so far to say that “Al-Manar was to Hezbollah what Pravda was to 
the Soviet Union.”129  In Hizballah’s preparations for another conflict with Israel, 
expanding al-Manar’s coverage area became a key part of their defense; it could 
now reach out via satellite broadcasts to Israel and much of the Arab world.130 
Satellite broadcast of al-Manar began on 25 May 2000, coinciding with the day 
that Israel pulled its last forces out of southern Lebanon, and as Avi Jorisch 
describes, “came to signify freedom from Israeli occupation”.131  By the summer 
of 2006 Israelis could turn on their televisions and be exposed to daily 
propaganda being broadcast from Beirut including My Blood and the Rifle, 
highlighting Hezbollah fighters who died fighting against Israel, and The Spider’s 
House, a talk show pointing out “the weakness of the Zionist entity” and various 
strategies for destroying Israel.  Al-Manar’s reporting skills had also developed 
over the years.  Long before the U.S. picked up the concept of embedded 
reporters, Hizballah placed al-Manar reporters inside elements of the group’s 
Islamic Resistance militia.  Schliefer in his piece highlights this as a key channel 
of communication for Hezbollah’s PSYOP capability, and goes so far as to add 
that Hezbollah’s propaganda machine can be summed up with the words “If you 
haven’t captured it on film you haven’t fought”.132  Furthermore, he goes on to 
add that “Hezbollah…regarded the video…as an object of operation” and that in 
the run up to the 2000 Israeli withdrawal saw how it was possible to “net huge 
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military and psychological dividends” from a video camera and a patrol.133  By 
the summer of 2006, al-Manar had mastered this technique, placing its reporters, 
who many believed were trained fighters, into guerrilla units having them record 
the battles and then broadcasting the material around the region.  Even more 
interesting is the fact that other networks such as al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya used 
this footage, without checking the validity of al-Manar’s version of events.134  This 
action by al-Jazeera and other networks to use this footage aided in Hizballah’s 
deception of unit locations and Katyusha rocket launching sites.  In addition 
pictures from the war zone often made their way to the front page of newspapers 
and internet sites from sources inside the conflict area without verification of their 
authenticity. 
Because Hizballah tightly controlled the operating environment through 
their use of a variety of OPSEC activities, only the information that they wanted 
released usually made it out of Lebanon and into news broadcasts, websites, or 
morning newspapers.  Hizballah even began giving guided tours of bombed out 
neighborhoods, stating that reporters “could only take pictures of sites approved 
by their Hizballah minders.  Violations they were told, would be treated 
harshly…offending reporters would never again be allowed access to Hezbollah 
officials or Hezbollah-controlled areas.”135  Some reporters recognized it for 
exactly what it was, “an attempt to create and control a story.”136  Yet few 
journalists did anything about this and continued to tell Hizballah’s narrative to 
the world, regardless of whether it was true or not.  The theme that resonated 
from these journalists, dispropotionality, could be seen across the world from 
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Yahoo news to CNN and al-Jazeera to the BBC.137  In content analysis done by 
Harvard’s Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, the center 
found in repeated surveys that based on media content in various outlets both in 
the Middle East and in the West, Israel consistently came out labeled as the 
aggressor in the conflict.138  Hizballah did this to deceive the masses about what 
was really happening: the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers, the daily rocket 
attacks against Israeli from inside populated areas such as Qana and Hizballah’s 
own tactics for fighting the war.  Unlike other deception operations Hizballah 
utilized, however, this one would have mixed results. 
The information age truly puts an emphasis on the individual and even the 
populace as the centers of gravity or target audiences in conflicts.  No longer are 
they purely military on military battles, but the possibility exists that every single 
person with access to a cell phone or computer can contribute to the war effort.  
The effects from the summer conflict draw attention to this point.  With one 
audience Hizballah’s deception through the media proved very effective, yet with 
another it was exposed for what it was: a fraud.  In the first case following the 
initiation of hostilities, Hezbollah found itself being publicly rebuffed by many 
Arab states to include Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt; their actions in 
kidnapping the two IDF soldiers seen as being “reckless” and full of 
“adventurism” by these Arab governments.139  This opinion, however, was not 
shared by these countries’ populaces.  As the conflict wore on and Hezbollah 
continued to stand up to Israeli attacks both on the ground and in the air, many of 
the same governments founds themselves in trouble as a growing schism 
developed between the governments who had earlier rebuffed Hizballah and 
their people.  In the midst of the conflict Faiza Ambah of the Washington Post 
stated that in respect to the conflict that for these Arab governments that “each 
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day the assault continues, they lose popularity and the respect of their 
people”.140  Hassan Nasrallah became a hero across countries like Egypt and 
Jordan as people took to the streets in support of Hezbollah, and to denounce 
their own governments for not supporting the terrorist group.141  As hostilities 
continued public opinion forced these same governments to reverse course on 
earlier statements and try to take an uneasy middle ground, while distancing 
themselves from both Israel and the United States.  Jordan dispatched medical 
teams to Lebanon to help the “victims of Israeli aggression” while Saudi Arabia 
threatened to pull the plug on a 2002 peace plan between Arab states and 
Israel.142 
While the Arab states fell for Hizballah’s ploy, in the United States 
something very different happened.  If there are three names that are 
remembered for the summer conflict they will probably be Hizballah Leader 
Hassan Nasrallah, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, and photographer Adnan 
Hajj.  While Nasrallah and Olmert will be remembered for their roles as leaders, 
Hajj on the other hand will probably be remembered for something very different.  
For it was Adnan Hajj, working for Reuters, who took the following photographs: 
the first being the original and the second being doctored it and sent out across 
the wire services: 
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Figure 5.   Original Reuters Picture143 
 
 
Figure 6.   Adnan Hajj’s Doctored Photograph144 
 
Shortly after the photo was published, the web blog site Little Green Footballs 
(http://littlegreenfootballs.com/) ran an entry questioning the authenticity of the 
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photo.  This website, already popular for exposing the fraudulent memos that 
surfaced regarding President Bush’s career in the Air National Guard and forced 
Dan Rather to resign from CBS news, again struck a coup of sorts.  Within days 
Reuters pulled the photos and all the photos Hajj had taken and issued an 
apology.  While it is unclear whether or not Hajj was working for Hizballah, the 
fact remains that he was attempting to execute his own deception operation 
which supported Hizballah’s overall objectives.  And this was not the only time 
this occurred during the conflict; several bloggers banded together against other 
reportedly doctored photographs taken in Lebanon to combat what they saw as 
the “lamestream media.”145  This incident showed a powerful new tool in 
combating deception in the information age.  If journalists were part of new 
weapons systems then bloggers are now finding themselves in a role “as a club 
against the entire mainstream media.” 146  In an interview with Marvin Kalb, Ravi 
Nessman of the Jerusalem office of the Associated Press asserts that the 
influence of bloggers “was unprecedented” in this conflict and that when the 
bloggers [in the U.S.] discovered that photographs had been doctored “the 
credibility of the bloggers…skyrocketed and our credibility plummeted.”147  
Hizballah’s use of deception had met a speedbump. 
The use of information technology is not a traditional deception operation.  
But in evaluating this deception tactic, it is possible to see how the information 
age is producing new opportunities for deception in warfare. First of all, Hizballah 
took measures to simultaneously condition different targets’ beliefs and this is 
now quite apparent in the responses of U.S. versus eastern audiences to the 
narrative told through media outlets.  Specifically in the case of Middle Eastern 
audiences Hizballah’s story influenced those governments once seen as hostile 
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at the onset of hostilities to the organization to reverse their opinions.  This leads 
to the final objective set forth by Daniel and Herbig, being able to benefit from the 
deception, because Hizballah profited from the target’s actions through not only 
direct aid as was the case with Jordan, but in further isolating Israel through 
Saudi Arabia’s actions.  While in the West, the rise of bloggers had a reverse 
effect on the populace and in fact helped to challenge the media’s role in the 
deception outright, something that had never been seen before in a conflict.  On 
the issue of type of deception, this case would fall into the idea of ambiguity 
increasing because of the varied audiences and the global network of ideas 
readily available to the masses; no one was really sure what to believe.   
In looking at the categories of deception, this example lies in the realm of 
false and planted information, because Hizballah controlled the story and what 
was published and often could be found working behind the scenes to ensure 
that it was perfect.  In essence they created their own television show to be 
broadcast around the world via more mainstream media channels.  On the final 
issue of sensors for this deception, it is becoming ever more apparent that in the 
information age and the proliferation of technology there now exists a new sensor 
unaddressed before in military operations, that of the individual.  How the 
individual responds to the story and networks with others to come together and 
make their voice heard, is clearly a new type of sensor which challenges the 
existing information flow structure addressed in Chapter II, but in particular the 
bureaucracy of the intelligence service as the key means of influencing 
decisionmakers.  Altogether this is a mixed case of deception because what 
worked to change the minds of leaders in the Middle East failed dramatically in 
the United States.  The use of the media as a tool for deception and its challenge 




The following table summarizes this deception operation: 
CRITERIA EVALUATION 
Three Objectives: 
- condition the target’s beliefs? 
- influence the target’s actions? 
- target’s actions must benefit the 
deceiver? 
 
- Through al-Manar & other new agencies on 
the ground, Hizballah painted its story to the 
world.   
- Arab audiences were convinced of 
Hizballah’s actions and it reversed the 
attitudes of the governments. 
M-type or A-type? 
 
 
M-type: Hizballah sought to mislead 
audiences and decisionmakers from their 
true actions inside Lebanon. 
Sensors targeted? The media, also the individual. 
9 Characteristics? 
(concealment, camouflage, false and 
planted information, ruses, displays, 
demonstrations, feints, lies, and insight)  
False and planted information: Hizballah 
only showed the reporters what they wanted, 
the reporters broadcast the facts that they 
had. 
Table 6.   The Media Deception 
 
G. HIJACKING THE INTERNET 
The final case of deception in this study again focuses on deceit in cyber 
conflicts of the information age.  Like the media, cyberspace is a new non-
traditional area for deception, and like the media it was the work of individuals 
outside of state run institutions which stood up to challenge these deceptive acts.   
As Israel mounted its bombing campaign against Hizballah in the summer 
of 2006, one of the prime targets became not only the Headquarters of al-Manar 
television, but many of the other supporting facilities such as antenna and 
broadcasting sites.  Despite repeated attempts by the IDF to put the television 
network out of commission, al-Manar broadcasted continuously from hidden 
locations and even thwarted being hacked into by the elements from the IDF’s 
intelligence corps.148  Ultimately, the IDF’s hacking campaign only affected the 
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internal Lebanese broadcasts of al-Manar, but the rest of the Arab street 
maintained an uninterrupted satellite feed for the duration of the war.   
This cyber war between IDF hackers and al-Manar pushed the conflict into 
a new arena.  Hezbollah turned to hiding and hijacking in the internet in an 
attempt to restore its message of resistance.  Hilary Hylton of Time researched 
this aspect of Hizballah’s information plan and found that hackers from the 
militant Lebanese group searched the internet for vulnerable sites to hijack and 
then communicate with one another.149  She states “Hizballah uses these Web 
sites to run recruitment videos and post bank account numbers where supporters 
can donate funds” and that these communications portals are “critical as 
Hizballah tries to get its global message out to the world”.150  One hijacking 
occurred on a South Texas cable company: 
Al-Manar…linked to the small cable company’s IP address, which 
can be thought of, in simple terms, as a telephone number.  
Hizballah essentially added an extension on that telephone line 
allowing their traffic to flow.  Hizballah then gets the word out 
through e-mail and blogs that it can be found at that IP address and 
the hijack is complete.  If the hijack is not detected, the IP address 
can be linked to a new domain name and that opens up the site to 
anyone who might search online for al-Manar content.151 
Since in the past many companies would not realize if this was occurring, and 
groups such as Hizballah could get away with it, this tactic proved very useful for 
terrorists or insurgent groups to continue to get their message out, even if it was 
impossible to do so from their home countries.   
While instances of cyber deception similar to this had worked in the past, 
this time it failed due to the work of networked groups like the Society for Internet 
Research, “an informal consortium of self-described ‘freelance counterterrorists’ 
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who sit in home offices and dens tracking jihadist activity on the Internet.”152  It 
was this group that tracked Hizballah’s web activities to the Texas cable 
company and notified U.S. authorities who in turn shut the IP address down.  As 
a result Hizballah’s al-Manar was forced to look for other IP’s until its own could 
be re-established after the war.   
While this case of cyber-hijacking is not as strong a deception case as the 
previous examples, it still deserves mention because it shows the lengths that 
groups like Hizballah will go to in an effort to put out their message.  In regard to 
deception type criteria, this action does not meet the idea of conditioning a 
target’s beliefs; rather it is simply an act designed for the deceiver to hide within 
the target and maintain some level of cover and concealment.  Furthermore, 
there is no influence to the target’s actions; however, by having an open IP 
address, the deceiver is able to benefit from the target’s actions.  As mentioned 
this particular case is best considered in the category of concealment or 
camouflage, yet does not fit into either of the two types of deception identified, 
neither ambiguity increasing nor misleading.  Therefore this case provides the 
possibility for a new type of deception, one in which the deceiver attempts to 
purely conceal themselves.   
Regarding sensors, however, cyber hijacking primarily rests on the ability 
of host to leave backdoors open to its systems for these hacking bodies to attach 
themselves to.  Finally, the case of cyber hijacking reinforces the power of the 
individual or networks to counter this and similar threats in cyberspace.  While it 
is seemingly a weak form of deception in the realm of cyber warfare, the fact that 
networks like the Society for Internet Research are patrolling the internet on their 
own, without government involvement, shows another prime example of how the 
information age has empowered what traditionally have been considered non-
combatants to take matters into their own and counter deception from the 
comfort of their own homes.  The following table summarizes this case: 





- condition the target’s beliefs? 
- influence the target’s actions? 
- target’s actions must benefit the 
deceiver? 
 
- Hizballah successfully hijacked unknowing 
IP addresses in cyberspace for its al-Manar 
websites. 
- Networked groups around the US looked 
for and found these hijacked sites. 
 
Sensors targeted? The only sensors targeted were unknowing 
ISPs who had no idea what Hizballah was 
doing. 
Type: 
M-type or A-type? 
 
Neither type fits into this criteria for 
deception because it success lies in staying 
hidden. 
9 Characteristics? 
(concealment, camouflage, false and 
planted information, ruses, displays, 
demonstrations, feints, lies, and insight)  
Concealment: Hizballah hid from plain view 
and known IP addresses after Israel 
destroyed many of their support facilities in 
Lebanon.  
Table 7.   Hijacking the Internet 
 
This is another example of the interaction between information activities.  
The use of the internet covers over into the realm of computer network 
operations and through this example it is apparent that the concept of deception 
still plays out in cyberspace today. 
H. CONCLUSION 
The preceding paragraphs present several cases of deception from the 
Israel-Hizballah conflict along with supporting information on how Hizballah 
managed to deny Israel access to many of their traditional sources of 
information, thus allowing Hizballah to dominate Israel in ways unforeseen only a 
short time ago.  Two of the studies showed how traditional forms of deception are 
still very applicable to modern warfare, while at least one of the last two cases 
shows how using the media is transforming deception it the information age.  In 
the last instance of internet hijacking shows how groups like Hizballah will hide in  
  62
cyberspace, utilizing unknowing targets to further their objectives.  Despite of this 
example, there are still key lessons to be learned and applied regarding 




Oh what a tangled web we weave 
When first we practice to deceive! 
-Sir Walter Scott 
Marmion. Canto vi. Stanza 17 
A. RE-EXAMINING DECEPTION IN THE INFORMATION AGE 
This paper has argued that Hizballah used deception tactics very 
effectively in their defense of southern Lebanon during the 2006 Summer War 
against Israel; this use of deception significantly offset many of Israel’s hard 
power advantages.  Hizballah’s use of deception not only worked on a tactical 
level, but operationally as well.  Moreover, Hizballah used new forms of 
information technology based deception relevant in the information age.   
Three of the four cases explored and evaluated met the criteria of 
deception, but all show at least elements of deception.  And while two of the 
cases, the bunkers and the EW bluff, are more traditional forms of deception, the 
latter cases of the media and hijacking the internet show the complexities of 




Fake Bunkers Tactical Hizballah built fake bunkers to confuse Israeli 




Tactical/Operational Hizballah bluffed about being able to listen 
into Israeli secure frequency hopping radio 
systems. 
The Media Operational Hizballah used the media as their tool to 




Tactical/Operational Hizballah “hid” on internet service providers 
in the US to maintain its capability to 
broadcast via broadband. 
Table 8.   Summary of Deception Activities 
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Based on this information regarding the press and the bloggers, a further 
question may be raised regarding deception and information flow.   
 
Figure 7.   Deception Information Flow to Target 
 
Having tested the above presented model in Chapter II based on the summer 
conflict, it appears that the information age has changed the information flow 
model somewhat.  Specifically, the intelligence services are no longer the only 
stepping stone in which information from sensors can be evaluated and 
forwarded to the ultimate target, the opponent’s leadership.  Now individuals can 
influence the adversary through access to information technologies such as the 
Internet and home computers.  Furthermore, the individual can use technology to 
network with others to counter deceptive acts by an opponent.  Individuals can 
also directly affect the deceiver’s message and take that to the leadership, as in 
the case of Arab states such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia.  Finally, adversarial 
decisionmakers’ actions may differ to the deception based on how these 
networks and sensors react to the deception. 
With these thoughts in mind, a newer information flow hierarchy model for 








Figure 8.   New Model for Deception Information Flow Hierarchy 
 
The new model captures two changes in particular.  First, the power of 
information to be spread quickly and independently can affect the enemy’s 
leadership.  A deception operation, using media sources, like Hizballah’s EW 
bluff, has the capability to reach top commanders quickly, often bypassing 
intelligence services.  Second, as noted by the reverse arrows, individuals and 
networked groups now have the potential to challenge many sensors sending 
information out and to counter it, as witnessed in the use of the bloggers and 
other internet groups in challenging the “lamestream media,” as well as efforts by 
Hizballah to hide on the web.  Marvin Kalb addresses this idea of the media & 
bloggers when he writes:   
“Broadcast via broadband,” in the context of asymmetrical warfare, 
involves an unimaginable convergence of hi-tech gadgetry and 
populist journalism, enriched by millions of bloggers offering their 
opinions, influencing policy and public opinion, questions decisions 
by officials, doubting the credibility of journalists, presenting 
commentaries as well as photographic evidence—in a nutshell, 
scrambling opinion with fact and affecting the course and conduct 
of a war.153  
                                            












In conclusion the information age has created new checks and balances to the 
deception game.  These factors must be taken info account in the planning of 
deception operations in the future.   
B. LINKAGES BETWEEN INFORMATION OPERATION CAPABILITIES 
As shown throughout this paper, there are linkages between all of the 
information activities identified in Chapter II.  Hizballah has proven that these 
information operations capabilities go hand in hand during major combat 
operations and thus validating U.S. joint doctrine.  Deception cannot exist apart 
from these other information capabilities.  This should serve as evidence that 
these capabilities must always be simultaneously planned and executed as part 
of the larger operation.   
In the forthcoming new release of the U.S. Army’s Field Manual 3-0 
Operations, the manual divides the existing tenets of information operations 
(CNO, PSYOP, Deception, OPSEC, and EW) into subgroups isolated from one 
another.  In particular “information engagement” now only includes PSYOP, 
Public Affairs (PA), and Military Support to Public Diplomacy (MSPD), while EW, 
CNO, OPSEC and Deception fall into different categories with different staff 
sections responsible for planning each separately.  The Army should re-examine 
its approach to information operations using this study of Hizballah’s techniques 
and procedures as a guide.   
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Hizballah’s use of deception in the July-August 2006 conflict suggests 
several other areas of research.  Among these areas: 
1. Application of These Deception Criteria to Other information 
Age Conflicts 
Applying the qualifying criteria listed in Chapter IV to other contemporary 
conflicts would greatly enhance a study of deception in the present day.  In 
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particular conflicts such as the one between the U.S. and Al-Qaeda, Israel and 
the Palestinians or the ongoing conflict in Iraq could all serve as interesting cases 
to explore if there is deception occurring and if so, how does it apply to the 
criteria listed here.  In particular the idea of whether information technology is as 
present in other conflicts as it was with Hizballah could be addressed.  Another 
area might look at the information flow hierarchy and how it functioned during a 
similar conflict. 
2. Examination of the Relationship Between Psychological 
Operations and Deception 
Chapter II addressed the issue of deception and its linkages to other 
information related capabilities.  This is another area explored by further 
research.  In particular more research is needed between PSYOP and deception 
and operations psychological waged (i.e. rocket and bombing attacks aimed at 
civilian populace) to see where such area overlap and how they relate to one 
another.   
3. Deception in Computer Network Operations 
While this paper only scratched the surface on implications of deception in 
regards to computer network operations (CNO), a more indepth study should be 
undertaken to examine how such activities could occur and their implications for 
cyberwarfare in the 21st Century.  Based on this research, analysts could 
construct a separate model for deception and CNO.  Hizballah’s use of the 
internet could serve as an excellent example of such activity. 
4. The Role of Non-Combatants in Information Age Conflicts 
The role of the media in war is not new.  This thesis, however, presents 
some new avenues of research on the role of the media and other networked 
groups in deception. Andrew Exum points out in a recent article that “all media 
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are not created alike.”154  This war showed that the media, except in the case of 
al-Manar, unknowingly became a tool of Hizballah and therefore part of the 
deception plan.  This raises an important issue then that Exum also brings up, 
“For while Protocol I (Article 79) of the Geneva Conventions makes clear that 
journalists are to be treated as civilians, any journalist who engages in military 
actions forfeits his or her status as a noncombatant.”155  Re-examining the rights 
of the media in warfare based on Hizballah’s use of them, should be studied.  
This discussion should also be extended to explore those other networks such as 
the bloggers and internet groups who mobilize and take action on their own.  In 
addition a possible area of research may involve the use of bloggers for 
deception and the possibilities of such activities.   
D. CONCLUSION 
Regardless of how Israel may portray its accomplishments during the 
recent conflict including the destruction of Hizballah’s missile capabilities and 
reducing the organization’s ability to wage war, Hizballah still managed to spin a 
story of success: an IO campaign ripe with deception.  This study of Hizballah 
demonstrates that deception in the current operational and tactical environment 
still plays a key role in helping to achieve one’s objectives.  Deception is no 
longer inflatable tanks and fake airplanes; it has evolved to include information 
technologies of the 20th century.  Delivery of the deception signal to sensors, 
and that signal’s interpretation by not just traditional agencies but by networked 
individuals, has become as important as bullets fired at the enemy.  Hizballah 
realized the importance of the concept and employed it fervently in this conflict.   
The final impact of this conflict remains to be seen.  Power plays in 
Lebanon continue as Hassan Nasrallah and Hizballah vie for further 
representation in the government, aided by masses of Lebanese from all sects 
                                            
154 Andrew Exum, “Illegal Attack or Legitimate Target? Al-Manar, International Law and the 
Israeli War in Lebanon,” Arab Media & Society, February 2007,  
http://www.arabmediasociety.org/?article=20 (accessed 5 May 2007). 
155 Ibid. 
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marching behind them.  While many point to Israel’s decisionmaking as the 
reason it failed to win this conflict, Hizballah’s information campaign aided and 
shaped the Israel’s decision process.  This study should serve as an example of 
how deception can be employed to shape the outcomes of war.  If anyone thinks 
that these tools are only limited to Lebanon and Israel, they are sadly mistaken.  
The New York Times reports that as recently as the summer of 2006 in Iraq 
“Hezbollah had been training members of the Mahdi Army, the Iraqi Shiite militia 
led by Moktada al-Sadr”.156  Armies around the world must be aware of these 
deception tactics and methods less they face the same fate as Israel; the clock is 
ticking. 
                                            
156 Michael Gordon and Dexter Filkins, “Hezbollah Helps Iraq Shiite Army, U.S. Official 
Says,” The New York Times, 28 November 2006, late edition, 
http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/ (accessed 7 June 2007). 
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